Aiuppa v. United States, No. 2:25-cv-00121-ABJ (U.S. District Court, District of Wyoming) · built from the filed complaint, the government’s motion to dismiss, the family’s opposition and its exhibits, and the government’s reply, pulled from the federal court record (PACER).
A discussion thread read this case as an “employees can’t sue the government” question, because a news article described the defense that way. The court record says otherwise. Below is what the documents say, with the load-bearing passages highlighted.
The government is already spending tens of millions of dollars on this housing. A real lead test before anyone moves in costs a rounding error against that, and against a single lawsuit. The cost model rides along on the right; tap the tab any time to open it. Or open the full version: detectlead.com/prevention-model.
Tap any section to open it. The marker on each title explains what that piece is.
The plaintiffs are the two minor children, H.A. and S.A., brought by their parents as “guardians and next friends.” The parents’ own claims are not in the case. So the “a federal worker can’t sue his own employer” idea does not apply: the people suing are children who never worked for anyone.
The government is sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the law that lets people sue the United States for negligence. Its motion uses one narrow carve-out, the discretionary function exception, which blocks suits over genuine policy “judgment calls.” The government argues that placing the family in that house was such a judgment call.
The government gave the family no lead disclosure, no lead-hazard pamphlet, and no pre-lease hazard assessment, and told them the 1892 house was in “good condition.” These duties come from Section 1018 of the federal Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, and they apply whether or not the owner ever tests.
The complaint stacks the government’s own rules. National Park Service Reference Manual #36 says parks “must abide” and “must comply,” that staff must inform tenants of lead hazards, and that there is “no discretion on park staff for this obligation.” The internal rule: units known to have lead “will not be occupied by children under the age of six or by pregnant women.” The Department of the Interior handbook required a hazard assessment before any lease, and 24 C.F.R. Part 35 says the government “shall disclose.”
The disclosure form lets an owner who never tests check “no knowledge.” That does nothing here, because the complaint alleges actual knowledge: the government knew its pre-1978 housing, including this unit, had lead-based paint; later testing found extremely high lead dust that had been there a long time; and after the children were poisoned the government moved the family into a second pre-1978 unit, again with no disclosure, also contaminated.
Both children’s blood tests came back positive for lead poisoning. They moved into the unit on Officer’s Row, Mammoth Hot Springs, in October 2018; the house was built in 1892. At move-in one child was under age one and the mother was pregnant with the second.
Open any one to read the full document. Each opens with a yellow guide to the key passage.
The government asks the court to throw the case out for lack of jurisdiction. Its three moves: (1) placing the family was a discretionary judgment call protected by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exception; (2) no federal rule imposed an affirmative duty to test the housing for lead; and (3) the Act’s misrepresentation exception bars a failure-to-disclose claim. In its words, “none of the alleged directives are in fact mandatory and specific in the manner Plaintiffs allege.”
The family argues there was no discretion to protect, because the government’s own manuals and the federal disclosure rule made the conduct mandatory and specific (“no discretion on park staff”; units known to have lead “will not be occupied” by young children or pregnant women; the government “shall disclose”). The duty to disclose does not depend on testing, and the government already knew. They plead negligence and negligence per se, and brought the government’s own sworn 30(b)(6) testimony and manuals to prove the rules were binding.
The reply holds the line: it argues the manuals and policies are general guidance rather than the kind of mandatory, specific directive that strips discretion, and presses the discretionary function exception again. No ruling has issued; the motion is fully briefed and with Judge Alan B. Johnson.
All of this was avoidable. If testing for high-concentration lead paint and lead dust were simply standard, run before a family ever moves in, none of it happens.
It is avoidable a second way: a family that knows to ask, and has a test kit in hand, can find it themselves. I can help with that, in my limited capacity, one family at a time.
But the side that can fix this at scale is the government. It is already spending tens of millions of dollars on this housing. A real test before anyone moves in costs a rounding error against that. That is the opportunity sitting right in front of it, and it needs to act on it.
Sources: First Amended Complaint (Doc. 19) and its exhibits; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum (Docs. 20-21); Plaintiffs’ Opposition and Exhibits H, I, J (Doc. 23); Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 25). Aiuppa et al. v. United States Department of the Interior, No. 2:25-cv-00121-ABJ, U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming. Plaintiffs’ counsel: Jon M. Moyers (Moyers Law P.C.) and Kathryn Kohn Troldahl. Commentary on public court filings, not legal advice.
